Abstract-This paper deals with evidential networks to manage imprecise probabilities. Evidential networks are directed acyclic graphs that handle random, and epistemic uncertainties thanks to Dempster-Shafer structures. After we recall useful bases of the Dempster-Shafer theory, and the relation with probability intervals, we explain how to handle imprecision. Evidential networks are extended with imprecise utility functions to deal with system performance evaluation problems. We explain the application of evidential networks to system reliability evaluation problems. Then, applications to multi-state performance evaluation are proposed. The last section of the paper is devoted to study case systems.
. Plausibility, belief measures, and their complement [48] .
these methods are improved to offer better possibilities of modeling [5] , [6] .
In our opinion, Bayesian networks are an innovative tool for the study of system dependability which offer interesting possibilities. They allow a graphical approach to understanding the functioning, and malfunctioning, of systems; and they enable computation of reliability, and other parameters of interest. They offer a compact and modular approach [7] , which gives them many powerful modeling capacities. Moreover, many authors showed the equivalence with the standard tools under certain assumptions [8] . These various characteristics made Bayesian networks a tool of interest, and their improvements and applications are important in many fields [9] . This is why the goal of this paper is to propose a tool similar to Bayesian networks, called evidential networks.
In reliability studies of systems, the probabilities are usually considered as precise, and perfectly determinable. Moreover, all the information on the system reliability and its components is available. This completeness assumes two essential conditions [10] :
• all the probabilities or probability distributions are known to an understood engineering precision; and • each random variable describing the system's components' reliabilities are -independent, or their -dependences are known precisely. Utkin wrote in [10] that the first condition is rarely fulfilled, and advocates the use of probability intervals to represent this imperfection on probability measures [11] . We agree with this analysis, and consider that the use of imprecise probabilities as intervals is just one of the multiple ways to handle the problem of precision in the knowledge of probabilities. Indeed, many other authors considered the problem of precision with probability densities [12] , envelop of probabilities [13] , imprecise probabilities [10] , [14] , fuzzy numbers [15] [16] [17] [18] , or belief functions [19] . In our opinion, the question is not to oppose these various methods, but rather to choose correctly the framework of study in which they have the best assets [20] .
When the components' reliabilities are computed from databases, the problem of imprecision is critical, and can be easily handled by a probability distribution if the amount of data is sufficient. However, the problems of incoherency, and incompleteness of data, cannot be suitably handled by probability theory. Indeed, these problems cannot be correctly handled by a -uncertainty on the probability values whereas it underlies an epistemic uncertainty. Thus, the theory of evidence proposes an interesting, suitable formalism to handle this type of uncertainty. The theory of evidence, also called the theory of belief functions, is rather close to the theory of probability on certain points. On one hand, this closeness is interesting for engineers in reliability. On the other hand, the theory suffers from a major drawback in its use in complicated contexts. Indeed, the assignment function of the elementary belief masses, which can be compared to the elementary probabilities on the subsets of a random variable, requires allocating all the belief masses to each combination of the states of affairs, 1 to 1, 2 to 2
Because the number of states of affairs is important, the operation becomes tedious. However, this operation can be singularly reduced in the case of reliability analysis. Thus, we show in this paper how it is possible to simply apply the evidence theory to the reliability analysis, and to the analysis of performance of multi-state systems.
The goal of this article is to propose an evidential network for the study of reliability, and of the performance of systems by the use of junction tree inference algorithms, as it was proposed by Simon & Weber [21] , [22] . Much work exists around the concept of credal networks applied to the analysis of the reliability, or other problems of knowledge management, by taking account of epistemic uncertainty. Shenoy et al. developed 'Valuable Networks' [23] , [24] . They are powerful tools, and well suited to the modeling of knowledge. In addition, equivalences with the Bayesian networks under certain conditions were proven [25] . Smets [26] also proposed a similar graphic formalism for the handling of uncertain knowledge in the epistemic meaning. Cozman [27] , [28] proposes a network approach to model knowledge with imprecise probabilities that handle beliefs. The networks produced are called credal networks. Recently, Ben Yaghlane proposes evidential networks based on the transferable belief model of Smets, with the Dempster-Shafer rule of combination, and binary joint trees [29] .
To show how we handle epistemic uncertainty by our network approach, we structured our article as follows. In the second section, we give the useful bases of the evidence theory. The third section is dedicated to the formalization of the evidential networks for the handling of imprecise probabilities. We specify the use of the utility functions for the evaluation of systems' performances. The fourth section is dedicated to the reliability modeling of systems. The last section is devoted to two case studies to help readers apply our approach.
II. USEFUL BASES OF EVIDENCE THEORY
Evidence theory was initiated by Dempster [30] , with its work on the upper, and lower bounds of a family of probability distributions then reinforced by Shafer [31] . Several models of imperfect data processing were proposed:
• upper, and lower probabilities [32] ;
• theory of Dempster-Shafer [31] ;
• the hint model of Kholas & Monney [33] ; and • the transferable belief model of Smets [34] . On a discrete finite space, the model suggested by Dempster-Shafer can be interpreted as a generalization of the theory of probability, where the probabilities are assigned to sets in opposition to mutually exclusive singletons [35] . In the theory of probability, a measure is assigned to only one possible event, whereas in the Dempster-Shafer theory, a measure can be assigned to a set of events. However, when the information available allows the assignment of measures to single events (i.e. specific knowledge), the model of Dempster-Shafer merges with the traditional formulation of the probabilities, and these measures are known as Bayesian evidences [36] . The closeness between these two models reinforces the interest of the DempsterShafer theory for applications initially handled by the theory of probability.
A. Basic Mass Assignment
The main idea of the basic mass assignment is to allocate a measure between 0 and 1 to indicate the degree of belief about an event or assumption [31] . There can be several interpretations of these measurements which generate controversy on their use. Dempster-Shafer theory doesn't make the assumption of an unknown probability measurement, but does about subjective beliefs based on nonspecific information [37] . In the same way, Sentz [35] argues that it is not really a question about probabilities. However, many works are directed towards an objectivist approach of belief functions [38] , [39] . Thus, the term of basic probability assignment, as well as that of basic mass assignment, are both commonly read in literature [40] to model the same assignment process. The theory of probability, as well as the theory of Dempster-Shafer, offers an objective point of view, or a subjective point of view of knowledge [37] . When the process is carried out on large volumes of data, or directly starting from probabilities, the term of basic probability assignment could be perhaps preferred [38] , [39] . Basic mass assignment is suitable in the treatment of knowledge from experts' opinions [41] . Duong [37, p. 70] debates the insignificance of this interpretation problem that hides the common mathematical basis of these approaches. For our part, we will use the term "belief masses" in this article.
Applying Dempster-Shafer theory, we consider a set of mutually exclusive & exhaustive elements, called the frame of discernment, defined by (1) is the finite set of all possible issues where each proposition or hypothesis can support any information from different sources. The sources of information can distribute masses on every subset of the frame of discernment (2) A source of information assigns a belief mass between 0 and 1 only on hypotheses on which it has a direct knowledge, i.e. it does not assign any belief mass to any subset of [42] :
This process called basic mass assignment is represented by a function defined by (4) such that (5) and (6) Each supporting is called a focal set. The constraint defines on by (5) is not mandatory. It supposes that all hypotheses are known, In the case where , not all hypotheses are known [43] .
B. Belief, and Plausibility Measures
From a belief mass distribution, the upper, and lower bounds of a probability interval can be defined. This interval contains the probability of a set of hypotheses or focal sets, and is bounded by two non-additives measures called belief , and plausibility [44] . The measure of belief is the lower bound of the probability a focal set . It is defined as the sum of the belief masses of all subsets that contribute to such as . The upper bound is the sum of all belief masses assigned to subsets such that . , and are defined by (7) and (8) It results in the bounding property defined by (9) where remains unknown. It can take any value in . The bounding property (9) is well known, and has been defined since 1976 in the work of Shafer [31] . Many authors used it to connect the probability interval defined by , and the belief mass distribution [45] [46] [47] .
Plausibility, and belief measures are not dual because they are not additive within the meaning of the probability theory . However, the relations below can be established between , and . (10) and (11) with (12) describes the uncertainty concerning hypothesis represented by interval (cf. Fig. 1 ).
From plausibility, and belief measures, we obtain the basic mass assignment by the möbius transform [49] : (13) 
C. Probability Intervals, and Belief Mass Assignment
Ferson et al. [50] argues that each frame of discernment, or each Dempster-Shafer structure, specifies a unique p-box (probability box), and that each p-box specifies an equivalent class of Dempster-Shafer structure [51] , [52] . Ferson [53] describes the relation between these two generalizations of probability distributions. P-boxes are sometimes considered as a granular ap -TABLE III  TRUTH TABLE OF AN 'AND' GATE   TABLE IV  TRUTH TABLE OF AN 'OR' GATE proach of imprecise probabilities [32] , which are arbitrarily sets of probability distributions.
If the imprecision of a probability measure is described by a probability interval (restricted case of p-box), the relation with a basic mass assignment is directly obtained by (14) The transformation of a set of probability intervals to a basic belief assignment is obtained easily by (7), (8) , and (13). If (15) then (16) As argued by Smets [54] , the knowledge of measures and is equal to the knowledge of the basic mass assignment on the frame of discernment.
Nevertheless, as usually defined in works with interval valued probabilities [11] , two conditions should be considered when defining the probability interval distribution: (17) and (18) III. EVIDENTIAL NETWORKS In the modeling of complex systems for the analysis of their reliability, or their performances, the variables which represent the system, its components, its function, or the events of the system are related to each other. These relations can be represented by conditional dependencies. In this section, we propose to define an evidential network to represent the conditional dependencies between variables in a description space integrating uncertainty as belief masses in the meaning of Dempster-Shafer theory. The proposed evidential networks are directed acyclic graphs which represent uncertain knowledge as random & epistemic forms [22] . An evidential network is defined as a couple:
of a graph, and a set of belief distribution. When a node is not a root node, i.e. when it has got parents' nodes, its belief mass distribution is defined by a conditional belief mass table quantifying the relation between the node, and its parents. When a node is a root, an a priori belief mass table is defined.
A discrete random variable is represented by a node with its frame of discernment constituted by mutually exhaustive and exclusive hypotheses (cf. (1)). The vector , also called , is defined by
When a node is a child node, is represented by its own conditional belief mass table given its parents. Each conditional belief mass table defines the relation between the belief masses on the frame of discernment of the variable of each parent's nodes, and the belief masses of the frame of discernment of the child node. Fig. 2 shows two nodes, , and , defined with the frame of discernment , . Nodes , and , are linked to a node with its own frame of discernment . The conditional belief mass table of is defined by conditional belief masses for each hypothesis knowing the focal sets of its parents , and . For a root node, i.e. a node without a parent, the belief mass table is a vector representing the a priori belief mass distribution defining the amount of belief that a variable verifies the hypotheses of the frame of discernment.
To compute the marginal belief mass distributions of each node, we use inference algorithms. The exact inference is carried out by the algorithm proposed by Jensen, based on the construction of a junction tree [55, pp. 76] . This algorithm updates the marginal belief mass distributions on each node according to the evidence representing the knowledge introduced into the evidential network. The computation mechanism is based on Bayes' theorem, which is extended to the representation of uncertain information according to the framework of DempsterShafer theory (cf. (20) at the bottom of the page).
Specific evidence (Hard evidence) is modeled by a mass of 1 on one of the focal elements of the frame of discernment. Non-specific evidence (Soft evidence) corresponds to a mass distribution on the focal elements of the frame of discernment.
A. Belief and Plausibility Measures
To compute belief, and plausibility measures in an evidential network, it is necessary to apply (7), and (8) . When an evidential network is implemented in a tool, the exact inference algorithm allows us to compute , and measures. These measures cannot be computed in the same node because they are non additive measures. Simon & Weber [22] proposed to compute each measures on a focal element of a variable by two particular nodes (cf. Fig. 3 ). The node dedicated to compute is described by two hypotheses, Believe, and Doubt, according to the conditional belief mass table given on Table I .
The node dedicated to compute is described by hypotheses Plausibility, and Disbelief according to Table II. The structure of these nodes is generic. It is useful for the computation of belief, and plausibility measures of each node of the network, and for each hypothesis. Moreover, taking into account the bounding property (cf. (9)), these nodes allow the definition of a probability interval on any hypothesis of a studied variable.
B. Integration of Utility Functions in Evidential Networks
In some problems, a measure of satisfaction of a need or the achievement of a service is required. The concept of utility (20) allows this measurement. Thus, for the evaluation of performances using the evidential networks, it is necessary to introduce the concept of utility.
A utility function conveniently represents preferences of a decision maker. The utility function should be defined according to each possible decision. It can be cardinal if the utility is a unit of measurement of a particular good or service with a cardinal scale like meter or second. It can be ordinal if a particular good or service cannot be measured using an objective scale. In this case, the decision maker should rank the different possible alternatives available, and show its preferences according to each possible decision. Thus, the goal is to build function from the decision space to such as implies that decision is preferred to decision . More generally, the decision can take account of several parameters; it is a function of in . Thus, the higher the value of the function for a decision is, the more appreciated is this decision. The function represents the preference of the decision maker iff whatever , and , we have
If we associate consequences to each decision that can take 's states and probabilities to each consequence, the decision-maker chooses the decision state that maximizes the expected utility [56] computed by (22) with Utility functions can be used in decision networks as we can read in [57] , [58] , and combines perfectly with Bayesian networks as Jensen shows in [55, p. 134] (cf. Fig. 4 ). To compute relation (22) , the weights should be defined in a utility node associated with a node of the network, i.e. with a random variable.
The use of the utility function in evidential networks rests on the same principle. However, the probabilities are replaced by belief masses . In the probability framework, the utilities were defined on specific hypotheses. In the framework of the evidence theory, it is necessary to define a utility associated to the focal sets of the frame of discernment related to the node representing the studied variable, while respecting the assignment logic of the utilities in the probabilistic case [59] . Thus, (22) is divided into two equations related to the belief measure or lower probability, and the plausibility measure or upper probability, to define the lower expected utility (cf. (23)), and upper expected utility (cf. (24)). (23) and (24) If we consider the non-specific hypothesis , meaning that hypothesis , or is verified knowing that , and are mutually exclusive, the corresponding utility must be given by the utilities , and . Thus, in the computation of the lower utility, which is the pessimistic case, we propose to define the utility weight as the least preferable among utilities , and by checking the dominance properties between the concerned hypotheses [59, p. 110] . For the upper utility, is defined from the most preferable utility. Equations (23), and (24) become with (25) and with (26) The main requirement to define utilities is to warrant , and can be translated into utilities as (27) We define the utilities in evidential networks from the probabilistic case where all are known. On this basis, the utilities in (25) , and (26) are easily obtained. Nevertheless, experts may want to change them while they respect (27) .
C. Discussion
The evidential networks proposed here are based on the exact inference algorithm defined by Jensen in [55] . The imprecision on probabilities is coded by Dempster-Shafer structures (frame of discernment) introduced on each root nodes. The value, assigned to the focal elements that combine elementary hypotheses of the probability framework, expresses the imprecision on elementary probability values. The conditional belief mass tables explain the relation between variables, and also the imprecision. The computation of inference is made with the total probability theorem, or Bayes' theorem extended to belief masses in the same way as proposed by Jensen. Thus, the computational complexity in evidential networks is NP-hard, as Cooper defined it for Bayesian networks [60] .
At last, belief and plausibility measures, or superior and inferior bounds of probabilities, are computed by particular conditional mass tables in two separated nodes in to respect the additivity axiom inherent to the inference algorithm used.
One main advantage to coding a Dempster-Shafer structure into an evidential network is to directly tackle imprecision without choosing probability laws for elementary probabilities, and without using Monte Carlo simulations. In the latter case, uniform laws were usually chosen, and a normal distribution law is obtained for the top event considering the central limit theorem. As mentioned by Ferson [53] , the central limit theorem is widely abused as a justification for a normal or lognormal distribution shape, where usually we didn't know the initial distributions.
A second advantage is that the sum of belief masses assigned to the focal elements of a variable is 1. Thus, evidential networks can compute the belief masses with exact inference algorithms.
IV. RELIABILITY MODELING BY EVIDENTIAL NETWORKS
As Rakowsky argues [48] , the community of safety & reliability engineers discovered Dempster-Shafer theory through the work of Guth [45] at the beginning of the Nineteen-nineties. Guth proposes to compute the probist reliability [15] of a system by a fault tree containing three hypotheses on the state of the components, or the system. Actually, as argued by Simon & Weber [22] , Guth extends the frame of discernment corresponding to the hypotheses of the probist reliability to the frame of discernment of the Dempster-Shafer theory:
• Probabilistic hypothesis-the system functioning is completely described by probability measures.
• Binary state hypothesis-the system can have only two operating conditions: the state of failure , and the typical operating state . Thus, the probabilistic frame of discernment becomes a Dempster-Shafer structure , which can be reduced to the three focal elements , , . Under the assumptions of probist reliability, the studied components, as well as the system, can be only in one of the two operating conditions at a given time. This is a closed world problem [43] , and the hypothesis does not carry any belief mass. The characterizes the lack of completeness of the states of affairs, and of course the knowledge of the analyst about the system state, or the components' states. So, in some risk analyses, for instance in reliability analysis integrating human, or organizational factors, it can be of interest to assign a belief mass to the . This model of incompleteness is more interesting than introducing safety margin on the final results to take into account the lack of knowledge. In this study, we consider the problem of reliability analysis, or the performance analysis of systems, as a closed world problem ; then the frame of discernment is restricted to . To model the reliability of systems by evidential networks, we transpose the approach suggested by Bobbio et al. [61] , [62] with Bayesian networks to evidential networks. The goal is to convert a fault tree into an equivalent network with the hypotheses suggested by Guth [45] .
A. Probist Modeling
A fault tree describes the propagation process of a failure within the functional structure of a system. The reliability of the modeled system follows the assumptions of -independence of the events, and of coherence of the systems [63] . The reliability is described by 'AND', 'OR', and ' -out-of-:G' gates combining the elementary events. To integrate the frame of discernment of Dempster-Shafer theory, the evidential network must model the truth tables of 'AND' gate (cf . Table III) , and 'OR' gate (cf. Table IV) [45] by tables of conditional belief mass [22] .
The conditional belief mass table representing an 'AND' gate is defined by Table V, and the conditional belief mass table representing an 'OR' gate is defined by Table VI. In Table V (resp.  Table VI) , corresponds to the state of the component , to the state of component , and (resp. ) are the inputs of the 'AND' gate (resp. 'OR' gate).
corresponds to the output of the gate.
The conditional belief mass table can be adapted to gates with more inputs, and also to -out-of-:G gates (cf . Table VII ). In addition, the coefficients of the conditional belief mass table take their value in because it is a translation of the truth tables of logical gates. These coefficients can take different values from [0, 1] if the modeling of different behaviors is expected, in particular when there is an uncertainty about the propagation of belief masses in the evidential network.
1) Plausibility, and Belief Measures:
To define the imprecise probist reliability of a system, it is necessary to compute the probability interval on the hypothesis of the belief mass distribution of the system using adapted nodes, as it was defined in Section III-A. The conditional belief masses of belief measure node are given by Table VIII , and those of plausibility measure are given by Table IX . 
2) Simplified Development of Conditional Belief Mass Table:
The growth of the size of the set of states immediately implies the growth of the size of the frame of discernment requiring a great modeling effort. Thus, for a component or system with two states, , the frame of discernment comprises hypotheses, and 4 a priori belief masses to define. If we consider that is not taken into account in the study, the cardinal of the useful frame of discernment is equal to 3. When 3 states are considered, ; and even if is not used, 7 a priori belief masses should be defined. The growth of the size of the frame of discernment influences directly the gates modeled by the conditional belief mass tables. Indeed, an 'AND' gate with 2 inputs, and 1 output, with 3 possible assumptions each, forces the definition of conditional masses. This growth of the number of a priori and conditional belief masses to define is a major drawback for easy use of the Dempster-Shafer theory. It has been often used to reject the use of this theory. In reliability studies, the effort required for the definition of the conditional belief mass tables can be largely reduced by the use of De Morgan's laws. For instance, let us consider the conditional belief mass table of an 'AND' gate with two inputs , , and one output (cf. [7] about reliability studies with Bayesian networks, the knowledge of the components or system operating modes can be imprecise, and uncertain. This can also concern evidential networks, and find its influence in the conditional belief mass tables. The conditional belief masses do not take their values from , but in [0, 1]. Thus, we have more flexibility to describe the influence between the operating modes. In this last case, the reduction of the analysis effort by the use of De Morgan's laws to define the conditional belief masses is not so clear depending on the nature of the relation between the different modes. Then, in the general case, the analyst must define each mass according to effective relations between the operating modes. However, these conditional belief masses can be estimated from databases.
3) Imprecise Reliability Parameters: Generic databases of reliability are often used to provide the failure rates of the components of systems, in particular for safety instrumented systems [64] [65] [66] [67] . Scalar values of failure rates are generally used to estimate the failure probabilities of components. However, the acquisition of reliability data, and the use of these data to estimate the failure rates of other components of the same type, introduce uncertainties. According to [68] , the data of reliability collected for a component can change with a range of 3 or 4, and sometimes a range of 10. In [63] , [69] , the authors propose to use coefficients of influence to take account of the real conditions of use of the generic values of failure rates suggested by the databases of reliability. Some databases of reliability [70] [71] [72] provide the lower, and upper limits; the average, or median values; and the error factors of the component failure rates.
When we work with lower and upper bounds for the constant failure rates of a component coming from databases , it is easy to define the bounds of the component reliability at a given time of mission using the following equation: (29) The definition of associated belief mass distribution is easily determined by (16) . In the case of probist reliability, we write (30)
B. Multistate Systems
In many cases, the system, as well as its components, can function in various states or operating modes characterized by various levels of performance. Such systems refer to multistate systems [73] . Applied to multistate systems, a reliability analysis allows computing a measure of the capacity of a system to provide a necessary level of performance according to its level of degradation. Multistate systems can also be subjected to undetected failures, which lead to the complete failure of the system, or its subsystems.
At the same time, the binary state assumption of components' operating modes can be removed because it does not suitably represent the degradation of components' operating mode of systems [15] , [74] . Various approaches allow handling the degradations of components. Some authors propose to deal with this problem within the framework of profust reliability [74] [75] [76] :
• Probability assumption-the operating condition of the system is completely characterized by probability measures.
• Fuzzy state assumption-the operating condition of the system is characterized by two fuzzy states, allowing a gradual transition between the typical operating condition to the failure state [77] . A second solution is to propose a description of the operating condition of the components, and of the system, by several states [78] . The accuracy of the description is more or less close to the real state of the degradation, and operating modes of the components or of the system.
1) Modeling of the Reliability of Multistate Systems by Evidential Networks:
To analyze the reliability or the performance of multistate systems, it is necessary to know all the operating modes of the studied system, and of its components. The operating mode of each component is supposed to be -independent of the operating mode of the other components. Moreover, the system is supposed to be coherent.
Let us consider a system with operating modes , and levels of performance defined as utility weights. Each level of performance corresponds to an operating mode of the system. Operating mode corresponds to typical operation, and is associated with the maximum level of performance . Mode corresponds to a total failure of the system, which induces a minimum level of performance .
The system is composed of components having each one operating modes . Operating mode is the typical operating mode of the component, and mode corresponds to the state of total failure of the component. The operating condition of the system depends on the operating condition of its components. Thus, the reliability of the system is expressed as the following structure function .
with At any time, the operating mode of a multistate system can be described by a random variable . The operating mode of each component can also be described by a random variable . Then, we can write as a combination of the random variables according to the structure function .
(32) At every time, the level of performance of the system is computed by the expected utility according to (33) As in Bayesian networks [7] , it is easy to take into account the multiple operating modes of a system, and of its components in the reliability analysis by an evidential network. It consists of defining the a priori belief mass tables, and the conditional belief mass tables. The qualitative aspect of the network, i.e. the graph, models the propagation mechanism of the influence of the operating modes, i.e. it models the structure function . The interest of using evidential networks is to represent the structure function synthetically in a factorized way while taking into account imprecision, and uncertainties.
We can also claim that the definition of the conditional belief mass tables for multistate systems is more tiresome because of the exponential growth of the combinations of operating modes. However, as we specified in Section IV-A-2, it is possible to reduce this stage, either by carrying out an estimation, or by using De Morgan's laws. De Morgan's laws allow simplifying 2) Imprecise Probabilities in Multistate Systems: In multistate systems, the probability for each component to be in one of its operating modes is given as a scalar value. If the provided probabilities are imprecise, these probabilities can be defined by intervals , where is the random variable characterizing the operating mode of an element. The translation of probability intervals to belief mass distribution is done as in the previous section by (16); or by (7), (8), and (13).
For instance, let us consider a system composed of components with three operating modes each , and three associated levels of performance , where is the most powerful level, and the least. The frame of discernment is thus , where doesn't remain a focal element.
If we lay out probability intervals at a given mission time for each defined mode, then (34) Then, the a priori belief mass table entries are defined by (35) According to (13) , the following relations are obtained.
Moreover,
From (7), and (8), The same approach can be carried out to compute the probability interval on each focal element of the a priori belief mass table, as specified by (16) .
V. STUDY CASE
This section is dedicated to the analysis of the suggested evaluation method applied to the reliability analysis of two systems. For this purpose, we choose to study two systems of different complexity level. The first one is a binary state system, and the second one is a multi-state system. Two cases are distinguished according to whether the probabilities are precise or not. The inference in evidential networks is made by the algorithm of exact inference implemented in Bayesialab. 1 Evidential networks are directly modeled by using the graphic interface of this tool.
A. Probist Reliability of a 2-Out-of-3:G System
For the first example, we propose to simulate a 2-out-of-3:G system. The goal is to show the capacity of evidential networks to compute the systems reliability. The evidential network of a 2-out-of-3:G system is defined in Bayesialab with the structure presented on Fig. 5 , and the conditional belief mass table (Table VII) .
1) Precise Probabilities:
To simplify the example, and without loss of generality, let us consider that each component has the same failure rate . The elementary events which lead the components from state to state are -independent. The system is homogeneous, and no repair is considered. The system reliability is given by with (36) with the number of working components out of . Let us consider , and . The probability for each component to be in state is given by . The a priori belief mass distribution of node is (37) Without imprecision on the value of , belief mass expresses that evidences are Bayesian, and .
1 www.bayesia.com/en/index.php So, the problem is completely Bayesian, and follows (36) . The system reliability is . Fig. 6 shows that the evidential network computes the exact value of the system reliability in node , where . This simple example shows that the coding of a priori belief masses with Bayesian evidences in the evidential network gives the exact value of the system reliability. Thus, as claimed by Simon & Weber in [22] , there is complete equivalence between evidential networks, and other probabilistic methods, such as Bayesian networks, in computation of system reliability with Bayesian evidences.
2) Imprecise Probabilities: Now, let us consider an imprecise failure rate of the components as an interval:
. The a priori belief mass distribution defining each component state at mission time is obtained by (7), (8), (13), and (29) . (38) The imprecise value of induces a belief mass , expressing the doubt about the knowledge of the exact value of . It translates a non strict Bayesian frame, and . Fig. 7 shows the result obtained by the evidential network.
The system reliability is obtained by the probability of the system being in operating condition at time , computed in node . It is between . Compared to the result obtained in the previous section, we notice that the bounding property (cf. (9)) is verified : with and
B. 2-Out-of-3:G Multistate System
To show the mechanism of evidential networks for the study of multistate system performances, we study the 2-out-of-3:G system provided by Gopal [79] . The system is composed of 3 components with 3 operating modes each . The system also has 3 operating modes associated to 3 levels of performance . The structure function giving the relation between the components' operating modes, and the system operating modes, is given by Table X. The function defining the relation between system performance , and the components operating modes, is expressed as the expected utility (cf. (22)) defined by the relation (39) where is the probability of the system being in operating mode , is the probability of component being in operating mode , and being the structure function given by Table X. To compute the system performance by an evidential network, we code the structure function suggested by Gopal (cf. Table X) in a conditional belief mass table inserted into node KN on Fig. 8 .
By adding a utility node , we compute the system performance according to (39) . The table of the corresponding utilities allows computing the performance (cf. Table XI) .
1) Precise Probabilities: According to Gopal [79] , if the distribution of component operating modes is , , , then the system performance is 0.822 units. We notice that the evidential network presented in Fig. 8 gives the same value of the expected utility with a priori belief masses according to the a priori probability distributions provided above.
2) Imprecise Probabilities: Let us consider the problem of imprecise probabilities on the component states. For example, and without loss of generality, we will consider that the probabilities of the previous problem are given with an uncertainty 0.05. We must compute the performance as defined by Gopal [79] in (39) with The evidential network on Fig. 9 models the problem of imprecise probabilities, and allows the computation of the system performance with its imprecision.
The computation of , and measures that the system is in state , and is done from the belief mass distribution in node. The results shown on the right side of Fig. 8 bound the precise value computed in the previous section. The utility function integrated in the evidential network on Fig. 8 is now divided into two utility nodes to compute upper limit according to Table XII, and lower limit  according to Table XIII . As we can see in Fig. 9 , the imprecision on the components' probabilities to be in each operating mode is propagated through the network, and induces a distribution of belief masses highlighting the imprecision on the system probability to be in its various operating modes. Taking into account the associated performances, the utility nodes introduced give a bound on the real utility value. Thus, the utility previously specifies in Fig. 8 , when the a priori belief masses are affected to the specific focal sets, is bounded by the lower, and upper utilities as can be observed in Fig. 9 . The bounding property is checked because we took care to bound each a priori belief mass of the problem without imprecision to deal with the problem with imprecision where we took a variation of 0.05. We can notice that the symmetrical bounding of the a priori belief masses does not necessarily give a symmetrical bounding of the utility.
3) Conclusion: As shown in this section, evidential networks can handle random, and epistemic uncertainties. Imprecise probabilities on elementary events are propagated through the network, and imprecise results are obtained. Imprecision is thus handled for probist reliability problems, and also for imprecise performance analysis of multi-state systems thanks to imprecise utility functions. All these abilities of evidential networks open significant possibilities to model reliability problems in a general way. 
C. Bridge System: Probist Reliability
For this second example, we have chosen a complex system as written by Villemeur [63] , with few components to facilitate comprehension. The bridge system (cf. Fig. 10 ) was widely studied, and Torres-Toledano [80] modeled its reliability with Bayesian networks. It consists of 5 components, and each component has two disjoint states for a problem of probist reliability. The elementary events on these components are supposed to be -independent. The system is homogeneous, and no repair is considered. By enumerating the minimal cuts or the minimal success paths, the evidential network shown in Fig. 11 is obtained to evaluate the reliability of the bridge system. This model was studied in [22] .
1) Precise Probabilities:
To study the reliability of this system, we first consider precise failure rates , , and mission time . The probabilities that each component is in state are , and . By using (7), (8) , and (13), the following a priori belief mass distributions are , and . The propagation of a priori belief masses in the network gives system reliability at , as confirmed in Fig. 11 . More details can be obtained in [22] .
2) Imprecise Probabilities: Now, let us consider the same problem with imprecise failure rates expressed as intervals:
, and . The a priori belief mass distribution defining the uncertain state of each component at mission time is obtained from (7), (8) , and (13). Fig. 12 shows the result obtained by the evidential network. The system reliability computed from node is the probability that the system is in an operating condition at time . . While comparing with the result of the previous section, we note that the bounding property (9) is verified. We can also note that the precise reliability obtained in Section V-C-1 is not the center of the obtained probability interval. It depends on the structure function modeled by the evidential network.
D. Multistate Bridge System
In this section, we study the performance of the bridge system in the same way as proposed by [79] for the -out-of-:G system studied in the previous section. We consider each component with 3 ordered levels of performance according to their operating mode. The structure function is a combination of 'AND', and 'OR' structure subfunctions of 2 components, which are given by conditional belief mass Tables XIV and XV. The structure function of an 'AND' gate between two components with 3 states each (cf . Table XIV) is converted into a conditional belief mass table (cf. Table XVI) . The same translation can be carried out for an 'OR' gate. These conditional belief mass tables can thus be used within the evidential network if the combination of the operating modes of the components induces the operating mode of the system according to the suggested structure functions. It should be noted that other structure functions could be modeled.
1) Precise Probabilities:
Let us consider that the system components show probability set , and for performance levels . As in Section V-B-1, we can compute the system utility from the belief mass distributions resulting from this set of probabilities; and (7), (8) , and (13). Thus, , and are obtained. The utility tables for , and are given by Tables XII and XIII respectively. The provided distributions are precise, and the system performance is also precise as shown on Fig. 13 , with a utility . 2) Imprecise Probabilities: Now, let us consider an imprecise set of probabilities concerning the distribution over the operating conditions of the components. Each probability is now imprecise with an inaccuracy of 0.05. The a priori belief mass distributions of the components are computed again by (7), (8) , and (13):
All the a priori mass distributions; the measures of belief, and of plausibility of the system at performance level , and ; and utilities , are indicated in Fig. 14 . As in the previous example, the upper, and lower bounds of the system utility surrounds the precise utility. Equation (9) is verified in the case of a utility computation. We notice that the system complexity is not an influence factor on the result obtained.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this article, we address the problem of imprecision in the reliability and performance assessment of multi-state systems. For this purpose, we have proposed the use of Dempster-Shafer theory to model the structure function of studied systems by a network approach.
We showed how to study the probist reliability of systems, regardless of their complexity, using evidential networks; and in particular how to take into account the uncertainty about the failure rates. We showed that Bayesian evidences provide a precise reliability value, even if they are coded in an evidential network, which allows a conventional predictive assessment of the reliability by fault trees, or system performance by Markov chains. When the input data are imprecise, we have a problem of imprecise probabilities, and we identified that evidential networks were able to propagate this imprecision from the root nodes to the target nodes. This capability allows us to determine the uncertainty of the reliability, or the system performance. In particular, we have shown that bounding precise input data by intervals of probabilities led to the bounding of the sought reliability or performance. This bounding allows us to compute optimistic, and pessimistic values of the studied parameter.
Finally, we have shown how to model precise, and imprecise reliability of a simple -out-of-:G system; then the precise, and imprecise performance assessment of any system. Thus, we are able to show the equivalence with other models. Then, we have dealt with the reliability analysis of the bridge system, which is a small complex problem in the reliability sense. We have evaluated its precise, and imprecise performance, which allowed us to conclude that evidential networks, and associated utility functions, allowing an easy, powerful modeling for the study of predictive parameters of complex systems.
This modeling capability pointed out that precise, or imprecise reliability, or performance assessments of systems can be extended to other parameters; and that evidential networks can address more general problems of imprecise knowledge.
